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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the run up to the recent European Union enlargement. It 
considers the accession of 10 Eastern European countries in view of the pre-
existing economic conditions. The paper also raises the question how the new 
member states can tackle their deficit problems. In particular, the paper pays 
attention to the question at what point the emphasis should be placed on cut-
ting expenditure rather than raising revenues. Furthermore, the paper ad-
dresses tax capacity and tax effort in the new member states. Finally, the pa-
per looks at possible negative relationships between corruption and tax effort 
on the one hand and corruption and foreign direct investments on the other.
INTRODUCTION
It was only 18 years ago that the Berlin Wall fell. Anyone who pre-
dicted at the time that the former East Bloc states would join the European 
Union within 18 years was considered to be a dreamer. However, after dec-
ades of communism and Soviet domination the countries in Central and East-
ern Europe wanted to return to Europe, as the then Czech president Vaclav 
Havel put it. The European Union responded promptly and positively by en-
couraging the former socialist countries’ reorientation to the West. As early as 
1989 the European Union set up the Phare1 program to offer financial support 
to the countries of Central Europe and to help them cope with drastic eco-
nomic restructuring and political change. The fact that this process started 
with Poland and Hungary seems quite logical, since they were the first of the 
former East Bloc countries to distance themselves from their communist past. 
The German unification in 1990 marked the end of the historic division of 
Europe resulting from the Yalta negotiations of the allies who defeated Ger-
many in World War II.
In 1991, Poland and Hungary were the first countries to conclude 
Europe Agreements with the European Union. Again, they were the frontrun-
ners in Central and Eastern Europe. The aim of the agreements was to estab-
lish a free trade area between the European Union and the associated coun-
tries. In 1993, Agreements were also concluded with Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
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public, Romania and Slovakia. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania followed in 
1995 and Slovenia in 1996. Next, the associated countries applied for Euro-
pean Union membership.
In 1992, the European Council adopted the now well-known Copen-
hagen criteria that candidate member countries will have to meet to a suffi-
cient number of benchmarks before accession negotiations can begin. The 
benchmarks comprise political, economic and administrative criteria. In 1997, 
the European Council invited five Central and Eastern European countries 
(Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) to start acces-
sion negotiations. Also, the European Union developed a pre-accession strat-
egy assisting the associated countries to prepare themselves for membership.
By inviting only five countries to open accession negotiations the 
European Council divided the ten accession countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe in a first wave (the five above-mentioned countries) and a second 
wave (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia). In 1999, how-
ever, the European Union effectively abolished the concept of accessions in 
two waves by also inviting the other countries to start accession negotiations. 
As a result, the European Union engaged in simultaneous accession negotia-
tions with all candidate member countries (including the two Mediterranean 
mini-states, Cyprus and Malta, but excluding Turkey).
In December 2002, the European Council closed negotiations with ten 
candidate member countries. As a result, they joined the European Union on 
May 1, 2004 and the European Union's membership increased from 15 to 25 
countries. Eight of the new member countries are former East Bloc states in-
cluding three former soviet republics (the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) and five countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Po-
land, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic). The other two countries 
that joined the European Union are mini-states in the Mediterranean (Cyprus2
and Malta). Accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania continued and 
resulted in their accession on January 1, 2007. In addition, there are three 
candidate member countries (Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey). Two of them 
(Croatia and Turkey) have already begun accession negotiations. Albania and 
the other former Yugoslav republics that are not yet (candidate) member 
countries are potential candidate member states. 
ACCESSION AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The accession of the former East Bloc countries has progressed sur-
prisingly fast. It seems questionable, therefore, whether they were ready for 
European Union membership in all respects. The Treaty on European Union 
says in Article 49 that "any European State which respects the principles set 
out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union". Article 6(1) 
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states that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, re-
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, princi-
ples which are common to the Member States.” The Copenhagen European 
Council has made the principles set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union more concrete. These so-called Copenhagen criteria comprise a 
political criterion, an economic criterion, and the ability to take on the acquis 
communautaire:
1. Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
2. The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope 
with competitive pressures and market forces within the European Union.
3. The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
The answer to the question whether candidate member states meet 
these criteria is political in nature and, thus, open to political interpretation. 
The impression has been raised that political pressure to keep the enlargement 
process going has prevailed in a number of cases and that in fact not all new 
member states sufficiently meet the Copenhagen criteria. The level of eco-
nomic development is generally still very low (and the unemployment rate 
very high), while the administrative capacity is often still very limited. The 
political criterion - democracy, the rule of law, human rights, etc. – together 
with geopolitical considerations seem to have settled the matter in a number of 
cases. The new member states in Central and Eastern Europe have little experi-
ence with a market system and the decision-making processes in Brussels. How-
ever, the European Union's eastern enlargement is a fascinating adventure that 
undoubtedly will lead to more stability in Europe and a reduction of the risk of 
wars within the area to zero. That was precisely the main driving force behind 
the creation of the European Union's predecessors in the 1950s.
Approximately half of the new member states still cope with budget 
deficits that exceed 3% of GDP (the Maastricht criterion). Figure 1 shows the 
budget deficits in the period 1991-2007 in the three regions that the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) discerns: Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, South Eastern Europe, and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States.3 In the first years after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union budget deficits increased to high levels. The highest level was 
reached in the Commonwealth of Independent States, it was somewhat less 
high in South Eastern Europe and the relatively lowest level was reached in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. From the mid-1990s, defi-
cits came more and more under control. Notably, from 2000 a kind of role 
reversal emerged. Deficits are now at the highest level in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic States and at the lowest level in the Commonwealth of
Independent. However, the average deficit in the Commonwealth of Inde-
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pendent States is heavily influenced by the large surpluses in oil-rich coun-
tries like Russia (8.1% in 2005) and Kazakhstan (5.3% in 2005). The differ-
ences among individual countries are also large in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic States, where general government balances in 2005 varied from 
a surplus of 2.3% of GDP in Estonia to a deficit of 7.8% in Hungary, while 
estimates for 2006 and 2007 do not fundamentally change the picture.
There are also considerable differences in attractiveness of the new 
member states for foreign investors. Table 1 displays the cumulative inflows 
of foreign direct investments since the fall of the Berlin Wall in each of the 
new member states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States as 
well as in the candidate member countries in South Eastern Europe. Given the 
differences in population size the table does not contain the total amounts of 
foreign direct investments, but rather the amounts per capita. Obviously, the 
Czech Republic is the foreign investors' darling. Notable is the second place 
of Estonia. As a former soviet republic its starting position was considerably 
weaker than those of the other countries of the former East Bloc. Contrary to 
Poland's image in the popular press and with the public at large this country 
has attracted a mediocre amount of foreign direct investments in the period 
1989-2006. Also notable is that Croatia scores relatively high with an amount 
of foreign direct investments that matches Slovakia's, which is number four 
on the ranking list of foreign direct investments in the new member states. On 
average, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States have attracted 
$3,030 per capita in the period 1989-2006, which is nearly two times as much 
as South East Europe’s average ($1,658).
TAX CAPACITY AND TAX EFFORT
Since most countries in the region cope with continued budget defi-
cits, as Figure 1 illustrates, the question arises as to how these countries can 
tackle their deficit problems. In principle, governments have a choice between 
two strategies: increasing revenues or cutting expenditure. It goes without 
saying that a combination of both strategies is also possible. The question 
arises on what basis a government can make a choice. In other words, at what 
point should the emphasis be placed on cutting expenditure rather than raising 
revenues? 
Answering this question involves evaluating a country’s tax capacity 
and tax effort. Tax capacity is defined as the ability of a government to raise 
tax revenues based on structural factors including the level of economic de-
velopment, the number of “tax handles” available, and the ability of the popu-
lation to pay taxes (Chelliah, 1971, p. 293). Tax effort is defined as a measure 
of how well a country is using its taxable capacity, that is tax effort is the ratio 
of actual tax revenues to taxable capacity (Bahl, 1971, p. 582). Indices of tax 
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effort provide a tool for measuring differences between countries in how ef-
fectively they are using their potential tax bases. These indices may indicate 
the appropriate policy for dealing with budget deficits. For example, countries 
with a high tax effort index may need to look at reducing expenditure rather 
than raising taxes (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997).
Figure 2 shows general government revenue as a percentage of GDP 
over the period 1996-2004 in the three regions, while it includes as bench-
marks the USA and the EU-15 (the European Union of 15 member states as it 
existed before May 1, 2004). In Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
States, the tax burden is comparable to that of the EU-15 and, thus, well above 
the level of the USA. In the mid-1990s, South Eastern Europe’s tax burden 
was well below the level of the EU-15 and even lower than the level of the 
USA, but it increased in the late 1990s. From the turn of the century tax levels 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States and South Eastern Europe 
are on average within the range of European Union countries, which is 
roughly 30-55% of GDP (van der Hoek, 2003, p. 22). Though large differ-
ences exist across individual countries, only one of the new member states has 
a tax/GDP ratio below this range. The total tax level in Lithuania amounted to 
27.4% in 2004, but it was somewhat higher in previous years. Slovenia’s 
tax/GDP ratio amounted to 45.4% in 2004, which was the highest of the ac-
cession countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. In two
other accession countries (Hungary and Slovakia) the tax burden in 2004 was 
also over 40% (nearly 45%). In particular in the period 1997-2000 the total 
tax level of Slovakia was considerably higher than in 2004.
In the Commonwealth of Independent States the situation with regard to 
the tax burden is the reverse. As can be expected, these countries face the 
greatest taxation problems. They have been under communist rule for over 
sixty years. The state financed itself through state-owned companies rather 
than taxation, so the countries in this region have little experience with taxa-
tion and markets. No wonder that they are the only of the three regions where 
the total tax level is clearly below the range of tax burdens in the member 
states of the European Union. Until the early 2000s it was even lower than the 
level of the USA. In 2004, five of the Newly Independent States had a 
tax/GDP ratio that fell within the range of European Union countries (Uzbeki-
stan with 32.3%, Moldova with 34.7%, Ukraine with 35.6%, Russia with 
38.6% and Belarus with 46.2%).
APPROACHES TO TAX CAPACITY
It seems relevant to know how well the new European Union member 
states are utilizing their tax capacity. Musgrave (2000) identifies three factors 
that determine a country’s taxable capacity: 
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 The stage of development, often measured by per capita income.
 The existence and extent of “tax handles”.
 Efficacy of tax administration.
Each of these factors contributes either to a country’s potential taxable 
base (for example the greater the level of economic development the higher the 
income tax base) or contributes to the accessibility to that tax base by the gov-
ernment. For example, an economy with a sizeable and established manufactur-
ing sector has more easily identifiable and accessible taxpayers than an economy 
that is largely agricultural or comprised of many small traders. A well-developed 
manufacturing sector points to the existence of a “tax handle.” 
A simple measure of tax effort across countries might compare coun-
tries’ tax/GDP ratios, but such comparisons would ignore differences in tax 
capacity across countries. Countries differ with respect to their economic situa-
tions, for example per capita income, economic structure, resources, and other 
factors. These differences must be accounted for when measuring tax effort. An-
other approach, therefore, is using regression analysis across countries to pre-
dict a country’s tax/GDP ratio (Bahl, 1971; Chelliah, 1971; Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam, 1997; Tait, Gratz, and Eichengreen, 1979; Tanzi 1968; Tanzi, 
1992). 
A tax effort index can be developed as the ratio of actual tax share to the 
predicted tax share. An index of 1 means the country’s tax effort is at the “ex-
pected” level, given the structural factors of that country. In other words, the 
country is using its taxable capacity at a level consistent with the average of 
the other countries in the sample. By comparing tax effort across similar 
countries, it may be possible to identify countries that have the potential to 
increase tax revenues through increased tax effort. Alternatively, countries 
may be identified where tax effort is already relatively high and it would be 
more obvious to closely examine the expenditure side of the budget in order 
to reduce the budget deficit. 
A study by Mertens (2003) uses a regression approach covering the period 
1992-2000 and including data for ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
and South Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
Notably, this sample does not include all new European Union member
countries. Rather, it comprises seven new member states, two candidate member
countries (Croatia and Macedonia) and one potential candidate member state
(Albania). A very interesting dimension of this study is that it presents a ranking 
based on each country’s deviation between its actual and predicted tax/GDP 
ratio. Table 2 summarizes the results. The value of –14.9% for Romania in 2000 
means that the country’s actual revenue share was 14.9 percent lower than that 
predicted by the model. To my knowledge there are no comparable data 
available for the "old" member states of the European Union. To obtain them 
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would require a separate research study because they will have to be calculated 
on the basis of a regression analysis.
The results of the Mertens study suggest that in several Central and 
Eastern European and South Eastern European countries - especially Bulgaria, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia - deficit reduction is possible through increas-
ing tax effort. The European Commission may use this kind of information to
assess to what extent these countries prepare themselves for membership of 
Economic and Monetary Union. As the new member states have to accept the 
principles of Economic and Monetary Union, they will have to meet the 
Maastricht criteria regarding inflation, real interest rates, budget deficits, pub-
lic debt and exchange rate stability. Contrary to the "old" member states, the 
new member countries do not have the latitude to opt out of Economic and 
Monetary Union. The European Commission may use the data pertaining to 
tax effort in particular in relation to the Stability and Growth Pact's budget 
deficit criterion.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The study cited above (Mertens, 2003) points out some possible ave-
nues for further research. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe and South 
Eastern Europe have had myriad tax law changes as well as major tax reform 
efforts during the 1990s. Reviewing these events may shed light on what is 
happening with tax effort in Central and Eastern Europe and South Eastern 
Europe. For example, Slovenia and Croatia consistently have tax effort indi-
ces above one, while both have positive deviations from predicted tax shares 
for each year. These two countries have many factors in common, including a 
steady approach to tax reform. Slovenia introduced a new income tax law in 
1994, a new tax administration law in 1997, and the VAT in 1999. Croatia 
began in 1993 creating its tax service, introduced income taxes in 1994 and 
the VAT in 1998. Because tax administration is an important component of 
tax effort, further examination of these relationships is warranted.
However, there is another factor that warrants further examination: 
corruption. Though it is a phenomenon that is not easy to study, data are 
available about perceived corruption levels in a large and growing number of 
countries. Transparency International, a Berlin based institution, publishes an 
annual Corruption Perceptions Index for a growing number of countries. The 
scores range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) and relate to 
perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and risk 
analysts. Respondents expressed their perceptions in surveys assessing a 
country's performance. At least three surveys are required for a country to be 
included in the Corruption Perceptions Index. Therefore, in its 2006 index 
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Transparency International could include only 163 of the more than 200 sov-
ereign nations. 
Table 3 shows the amount of perceived corruption over time in se-
lected countries. In 2006, Finland was perceived as the cleanest country and 
Haiti as the most corrupt. Table 3 includes new European Union member 
states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) as well as two candidate member 
countries (Croatia and Macedonia). In addition, it includes Russia, several 
large western countries (Australia, Germany, UK and USA), the two most 
corrupt “old” European Union member states (Greece and Italy) and a poten-
tial candidate member state (Albania).
Politicians pay lip service to the fight against corruption, but they fail 
to clamp down on corruption to break the vicious circle of poverty and graft. 
Corruption seems a self-sustaining phenomenon, since anti-corruption meas-
ures tend to be adopted where they are needed least: in countries that do not 
have particularly serious corruption problems (Steves and Rousso, 2003, p. 
28). Transition countries with low levels of administrative corruption have 
been more likely to adopt intensive anti-corruption programs than countries 
with high levels of administrative corruption. 
The low scores for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic 
States and South Eastern Europe – with Estonia and Slovenia as notable ex-
ceptions - indicate that doing business in these countries is not only subject to 
normal business risks, but also to additional risks resulting from corruption. 
As a result, businesses face additional uncertainties. Particularly worrying is 
that the amount of perceived corruption does not diminish over time in half of 
the new member countries. Rather, it remains more or less stable (Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania) or even grows (Poland). It seems 
plausible that a negative relationship exists between corruption and economic 
development in general. Corruption creates additional risks for businesses and 
disturbs market signals hampering economic growth. More in particular, 
negative relationships seem plausible between corruption and tax effort on the 
one hand and corruption and foreign direct investments on the other hand. 
Corrupt tax inspectors fill their private pockets rather than the public purse, 
while corrupt officials make foreign direct investments more risky. 
However plausible these hypotheses are, I have found only very weak
empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses of negative relationships be-
tween corruption and tax effort and between corruption and foreign direct in-
vestments. Figure 3 displays how the data pertaining to the Corruption Per-
ceptions Index and tax effort were related in 1998/1999. This figure suggests 
there is no relationship at all. Figure 4 shows how the averages of the data 
pertaining to the Corruption Perceptions Index in the period 1996-2006 relate 
to the average foreign direct investments data in the period 1989-2006. This 
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figure suggests there might be some weak relationship between the two vari-
ables. Therefore, it seems worth doing more research in this area in future to 
unravel a possible relationship between foreign direct investments and the 
extent of corruption.
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Figure 1. General Government Balances (in % of GDP), 1991-2007.a)
a. Estimates for 2006 and 2007.
Source: EBRD
Table 1. Cumulative inflows of foreign direct investments per capita (US$), 1989-2006.
New member states
1. Czech Republic 5,512
2. Estonia 5,098
3. Hungary 4,545
4. Slovakia 3,194
5. Latvia 2,203
6. Poland 2,123
7. Lithuania 1,669
8. Bulgaria 1,575
9. Slovenia 1,333
10. Romania 1,110
Candidate member states
1. Croatia 3,177
2. Macedonia 814
Source: EBRD
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Figure 2. General Government Revenue (in % of GDP), 1996-2004.
Source: EBRD and OECD
Table 2. Deviation of Actual Tax Share from Predicted, as a Percentage of Predicted, 
1992-2000.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albania -4.7 17.2 15.4 14.8 -12.2 -10.6 3.3 0.4 12.0
Bulgaria -3.5 -19.1 -8.9 -15.8 . -6.9 -1.4 -10.1 -13.4
Croatia . . 21.0 22.8 21.6 17.7 25.7 10.6 7.9
Czech Republic . 11.0 8.6 7.7 5.4 -2.0 -4.4 -2.0 .
Hungary 4.4 9.1 2.3 10.4 5.6 1.9 1.0 . .
Macedonia . . . . -4.1 -7.0 -10.6 -8.7 .
Poland -3.1 3.6 -2.3 -4.2 -6.1 -8.3 -11.6 -14.7 -16.6
Romania 8.8 5.1 -5.9 -3.5 -9.8 -14.6 -15.7 -10.1 -14.9
Slovakia . . -5.3 3.7 2.1 -5.9 -9.2 -14.3 .
Slovenia . 11.6 9.7 8.0 5.5 3.7 4.0 6.2 1.7
Source: Mertens (2003), p. 548.
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Table 3. Corruption Perceptions Index, 1996-2006
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Finland 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6
9. Australia 8.6 8.9 8.7 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7
11. UK 8.4 8.2 8.7 7.2 8.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6
16. Germany 8.3 8.2 7.9 6.2 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.2 8.0
20. USA 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.3
24. Estonia - - 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 6.0 6.4 6.7
28. Slovenia - - - 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.4
41. Hungary 4.9 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.2
45. Italy 3.4 5.0 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 5.0 4.9
46. Czech Rep. 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.8
Lithuania - - - 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.8
54. Greece 5.0 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
49. Latvia - - 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.7
Slovakia - - 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.7
57. Bulgaria - - 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0
61. Poland 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7
69. Croatia - - - 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.4
84. Romania - 3.4 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1
105. Macedonia - - - 3.3 - - - 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7
111. Albania - - - 2.3 - - 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.6
121. Russia 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.5
163. Haiti - - - - - 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8
Source: Transparency International
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Figure 3. Corruption Perceptions Index and tax effort, 1998/1999
Source: Transparency International and Mertens (2003).
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Figure 4. Corruption Perceptions Index and foreign direct investments, 1989-2006
Source: Transparency International and EBRD
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1 Phare is the acronym for Poland Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of the Economy.
2 Since Turkey occupied the north of the island in 1974, Cyprus is divided in Turkish Cypriot 
and Greek Cypriot communities. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is only recognized 
by Turkey. Officially, Cyprus joined the European Union as one country. Effectively, however, 
only the Greek Cypriot community joined.
3 Central and Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
South Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Mon-
tenegro, Romania and Serbia.
Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Commonwealth of Independent States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
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